Consistent belief functions represent collections of coherent or non-contradictory pieces of evidence, but most of all they are the counterparts of consistent knowledge bases in belief calculus. The use of consistent transformations cs[·] in a reasoning process to guarantee coherence can therefore be desirable, and generalizes similar techniques in classical logics. Transformations can be obtained by minimizing an appropriate distance measure between the original belief function and the collection of consistent ones. We focus here on the case in which distances are measured using classical L p norms, in both the "mass space" and the "belief space" representation of belief functions. While mass consistent approximations reassign the mass not focussed on a chosen element of the frame either to the whole frame or to all supersets of the element on an equal basis, approximations in the belief space do distinguish these focal elements according to the "focussed consistent transformation" principle. The different approximations are interpreted and compared, with the help of examples.
Introduction
Belief functions (b.f.s) [1, 2] are complex objects, in which different and sometimes contradictory bodies of evidence may coexist, as they mathematically describe the fusion of possibly conflicting expert opinions or measurements. This is the case, for instance, of the pose estimation problem in computer vision [? ] . There, image features do not necessary come from the object of interest, but may be extracted from the background: in such a case, the belief functions inferred from those feature will conflict [? ] . Indeed, conflict and combinability play a central role in the theory of evidence [3, 4, 5] , and have been recently subject to novel analyses [6, 7, 8] .
Consistent knowledge bases and belief functions. Making decisions based on objects collecting possibly inconsistent evidence, such as belief functions, is therefore less than trivial. This is a well known problem in classical logics, where the application of inference rules to inconsistent sets of assumptions or "knowledge bases" may lead to incompatible conclusions, depending on the set of assumptions we start our reasoning from [9] . A variety of approaches have been proposed in this context to solve the problem of inconsistent knowledge bases, such as: fragmenting the latter into maximally consistent subsets; limiting the power of the formalism; or, adopting non-classical semantics [10, 11] . Even when a knowledge base is formally inconsistent, though, it may contain potentially useful information. Paris [9] tackles the problem by not assuming each proposition in the knowledge base as a fact, but by attributing to it a certain degree of belief in a probability logic approach. This leads to something similar to a belief function.
Indeed, extensions of classical logics in which propositions are assigned belief rather than truth values exist [33] . In this "belief logic" framework, a belief function can be interpreted as the analogous of a knowledge base [12] .
But then, what are the counterparts of consistent knowledge bases in the theory of evidence? To answer that we need to specify the notion of a belief function "implying" a certain proposition. As we show here, under a rather sensible definition of such an implication, the class of belief functions which generalize consistent knowledge bases is uniquely determined as the set of b.f.s whose non-zero mass "focal elements" have non-empty intersection. We are therefore allowed to call them consistent belief functions (cs.b.f.s).
Consistent transformation. Analogously to consistent knowledge bases, consistent b.f.s are characterized by null internal conflict. It may be therefore be desirable to transform a generic belief function to a consistent one prior to making a decision, or picking a course of action. A similar "transformation" problem has been widely studied in both the probabilistic [13, 14, 15, 16] and possibilistic [17, 18, 19] cases. A sensible approach, in particular, consists of studying the geometry [20, 21] 
where b is the original belief function, dist an appropriate distance measure between belief functions, and CS denotes the collection of all consistent b.f.s. By plugging in different distance functions in (1) we get different consistent transformations. Indeed, Jousselme et al [22] have recently conducted a very nice survey of the distance or similarity measures so far introduced in belief calculus, come out with an interesting classification, and proposed a number of generalizations of known measures. Many of these measures could be in principle employed to define indifferently consistent transformations or conditional belief functions [23] , or approximate belief functions by necessity or probability measures. Other similarity measures between belief functions have been proposed by Shi et al [24] , Jiang et al [25] , and others [26, 27] .
In this paper we focus on what happens when employing classical L p norms in the approximation problem. The L ∞ norm, in particular, is closely related to consistent and consonant belief functions. The region of consistent b.f.s can be expressed as:
i.e., the set of b.f.s for which the L ∞ norm of the "plausibility distribution" or "contour function" pl b (x) is equal to 1. In addition, cs.b.f.s relate to possibility distributions, and possibility measures P os are inherently associated with L ∞ as P os(A) = max x∈A P os(x). In recent times, L p norms have been successfully employed in different problems such as probability [16] and possibility [28] transformation/approximation, or conditioning [23, 29] .
As the author has proven [30] , geometrically, consistent (as well as consonant [31] ) belief functions live in a collection of simplices or "simplicial complex" CS. Each maximal simplex CS x of the consistent complex is associated with associated with an "ultrafilter" {A ⊇ {x}}, x ∈ Θ of focal elements. A partial solution has therefore to be found separately for each maximal simplex of the consistent complex: these partial solutions are later compared to determine the global approximation(s). In addition, geometric approximation can be performed in different Cartesian spaces. We call the set of vectors of the first kind belief space B [21, 32] , and the collection of vectors of the second kind mass space M [23] .
Contribution and outline. In this paper, we solve the L p consistent transformation problem in full generality in both the mass and the belief space, and discuss the semantics of the results. After briefly recalling a few basis notions of the theory of evidence, we prove that consistent belief functions are the counterparts of consistent knowledge bases in belief logic (Section 2.2). As we investigate the transformation problem in a geometric framework, we briefly recall in Section 2.7 the geometry of the simplicial complex of consistent belief functions, and explain how we need to solve the approximation/transformation problem separately for each maximal simplex of this complex. We then proceed to solve the L 1 -, L 2 -and L ∞ -consistent approximation problems in full generality, in both the mass (Section 3) and the belief (Section 4) space representations. In Section 5 we compare and interpret the outcomes of L p approximations in the two frameworks, with the help of the ternary example. We conclude and discuss the natural prosecution of this line of research in Section 6.
Theory: consistent approximations of belief functions

Belief functions and belief logic
A basic probability assignment (b.p.a.) on a finite set or frame of discernment Θ is a set function m b : 2
Subsets of Θ associated with non-zero values of m b are called focal elements (f.e.), and their intersection is called the core:
A.
The belief function (b.f.) b : 2 Θ → [0, 1] associated with a basic probability assignment m b on Θ is defined as:
A dual mathematical representation of the evidence encoded by a belief function b is the plausibility function (pl.f.)
where the plausibility value pl b (A) of an event A is given by pl b (A)
and expresses the amount of evidence not against A. Generalizations of classical logic in which propositions are assigned probability values have been proposed in the past. As belief functions naturally generalize probability measures, it is quite natural to define non-classical logic frameworks in which propositions are assigned belief values, rather than probability values. This approach has been brought forward in particular by Saffiotti [33] , Haenni [12] , and others. In propositional logic, propositions or formulas are either true or false, i.e., their truth value T is either 0 or 1 [34] . Formally, an interpretation or model of a formula φ is a valuation function mapping φ to the truth value "true" (1) . Each formula can therefore be associated with the set of interpretations or models under which its truth value is 1. If we define the frame of discernment of all the possible interpretations, each formula φ is associated with the subset A(φ) of this frame which collects all its interpretations. If the available evidence allows to define a belief function on this frame of possible interpretations, to each formula A(φ) ⊆ Θ is then naturally assigned a degree of belief b(A(φ)) between 0 and 1 [33, 12] , measuring the total amount of evidence supporting the proposition "φ is true".
Semantics of consistent belief functions
In classical logic, a set Φ of formulas or "knowledge base" is said to be consistent if and only if there does not exist another formula φ such that the knowledge base implies both the formula and its negation: Φ φ, Φ ¬φ. Hence, it is impossible to derive incompatible conclusions from the set of propositions which form a consistent knowledge base. This is crucial if we want to derive univocal, non-contradictory conclusions from a given body of evidence. A knowledge base in propositional logic Φ = {φ : T (φ) = 1} (where T (φ) denotes the truth value of proposition φ) corresponds in belief logic [33] 
An alternative definition requires the proposition B itself to receive non-zero support by the belief function b:
Whatever definition we choose for such implication relation, we can define the class of consistent belief functions as the set of b.f.s which cannot imply contradictory propositions.
Definition 1.
A belief function b is consistent if there exists no proposition A such that both A and its negation A c are implied by b.
When adopting the implication relation (2), it is easy to see that A ⊆ B ∀A :
Furthermore, as each proposition with non-zero belief value must by definition contain a focal element C s.t. m b (C) = 0, the intersection of all non-zero belief propositions reduces to that of all focal elements of b, i.e., the core of b:
Indeed, no matter our definition of implication, the class of consistent belief functions corresponds to the set of b.f.s whose core is not empty.
Definition 2.
A belief function is said consistent if its core is non-empty.
We can prove that, under either definition (2) or definition (3) of the implication b B, Definitions 1 and 2 are equivalent. Proof. By Definition 1, in order for a subset (or proposition, in a propositional logic interpretation) A ⊆ Θ to have non-zero belief value it has to contain the core of b: A ⊇ C b . In order to have both b(A) = 0, b(A c ) = 0 we need both to contain the core, but in that case A ∩ A c ⊇ C b = ∅ which is absurd as A ∩ A c = ∅.
Achieving consistency in belief logic: consistent approximation
Belief functions are complex objects, in which different and sometimes contradictory bodies of evidence coexist, as they may result from the fusion of possibly conflicting expert opinions and/or measurements. It is reasonable to conjecture that taking belief functions at face value may lead in some situations to incorrect/inappropriate decisions. A variety of approaches have been proposed in the context of classical logics to solve the analogous problem with inconsistent knowledge bases: we mentioned some of them in the introduction [10, 11] . Paris' approach [9] is particularly interesting as it tackles the problem by attributing to each proposition in the knowledge base a certain degree of belief, leading to something similar to a belief function. As consistent belief functions represent consistent knowledge bases in belief logic, such a mechanism can be be described there as an operator
where B and CS denote respectively the set of all belief functions, and that of all cs.b.f.s. Consistent transformations (4) can be built by posing a minimization problem of the form
where b is the belief function to approximate and dist is some distance measure between b.f.s. It is natural to pose this problem in a geometric setup. . The set B of points of R N −2 which correspond to belief functions is an N -dimensional triangle or simplex called belief space [21] , namely:
where Cl denotes the convex closure operator 
In the same way, each b.f. is uniquely associated with the related set of mass values {m b (A), ∅ A ⊆ Θ} (Θ this time included). It can therefore be seen also as a point of R N −1 , the vector m b of its N − 1 mass components:
where m A is the vector of mass values associated with the categorical b.f. b A . The collection M of points which are valid basic probability assignments is also a simplex, which we can call mass space:
Binary example
As an example let us consider a frame of discernment formed by just two elements,
In this example mass space and belief space coincide.
Since In the binary case consistent belief functions can have as list of focal elements either {{x}, Θ 2 } or {{y}, Θ 2 }. Therefore the space of cs.b.f.s CS 2 is the union of two line segments:
It is easy to recognize that CS 2 can be synthetically 
written in terms of the L ∞ (max) norm as
The consistent complex
In the general case the geometry of consistent belief functions can be described by resorting to the notion of simplicial complex [36] . A simplicial complex is a collection Σ of simplices of arbitrary dimensions possessing the following properties: 1. if a simplex belongs to Σ, then all its faces of any dimension belong to Σ; 2. the intersection of any two simplices is a face of both the intersecting simplices. It has been proven that [30, 37] the region CS of consistent belief functions in the belief space is a simplicial complex, the union
of a number of (maximal) simplices, each associated with a "maximal ultrafilter" {A ⊇ {x}}, x ∈ Θ of subsets of Θ (those containing a given element x). It is not difficult to see that the same holds in the mass space, where the consistent complex is the union
of maximal simplices Cl( m A , A x) formed by the mass vectors associated with belief functions whose core contains a particular element x of Θ.
Using L p norms
The geometry of the binary case hints to a close relationship between consistent belief functions and L p norms, in particular the L ∞ one (Equation (6)). It is easy to realize that this holds in general as, since the plausibility of all elements of their core is 1,
i.e., the set of b.f.s for which the L ∞ norm of the "contour function" pl b (x) is equal to 1. This argument is strengthened by the observation that cs.b.f.s relate to possibility distributions, and possibility measures P os are inherently related to L ∞ as P os(A) = max x∈A P os(x). It makes therefore sense to conjecture that a consistent transformation obtained by picking as distance function in the approximation problem (1) 
while the same norms in the belief space read as:
In recent times, L p norms have been employed in different problems such as probability [16] and possibility [28] transformation/approximation, or conditioning [23, 29] . In the probability transformation problem [13, 14, 38] ,
, the use of L p norms leads indeed to quite interesting results. The L 2 approximation produces the so-called "orthogonal projection" of b onto P [16] . In addition, the set of L 1 /L ∞ probabilistic approximations of b coincide with the set of probabilities consistent with b: {p : p(A) ≥ b(A)} (at least in the binary case). Consonant approximations of belief functions obtained by minimizing L p distances in the mass space have simple interpretations in terms of redistribution of the mass outside a desired chain A 1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ A n , |A i | = i of focal elements to a single element of the chain, or all in equal terms [28] . Conditional b.f.s can also be defined by minimizing L p distances from a "conditioning simplex"
in the belief/mass space determined by the conditioning event A [23] . In the mass space, the obtained conditional b.f.s have natural interpretation in terms of Lewis' "general imaging" [39, 40] applied to belief functions. To minimize the distance of a point from a simplicial complex, we need to find all the partial solutions (9) on all the maximal simplices in the complex (empty circles), to later compare these partial solutions and select a global optimum (black circle).
Consistent approximation on the complex
As the consistent complex CS is a collection of linear spaces (better, simplices which generate a linear space), solving the problem (1) involves finding a number of partial solutions in the belief/mass space
respectively (see Figure 2-left) . Then, the distance of b from all such partial solutions has to be assessed in order to select a global approximation.
Calculation: consistent approximation in M
Let us compute the analytical form of all L p consistent approximations in the mass space. We start by describing the difference vector m b − m cs between the original mass vector and its approximation. Using the notation
is not included by normalization) the difference vector is
so that its classical L p norms read as
3.1. L 1 approximation Let us tackle first the L 1 case. After introducing the variables β(B) .
we can write the L 1 norm of the difference vector as
which is obviously minimized by β(B) = 0, for all B ⊇ {x}, B = Θ. Hence: 
The mass value for B = Θ comes from normalization, as follows:
The mass of all the subsets not in the desired "principal ultrafilter" {B ⊇ {x}} is simply re-assigned to Θ. A similarity emerges with the case of L 1 conditional belief functions [23] , when we recall that the set of L 1 conditional belief functions b L 1 ,M (.|A) with respect to A in M is the simplex whose vertices are each associated with a subset ∅ B ⊆ A of the conditional event A, and have b.p.a. (compare Equation (13)):
In the L 1 conditional case, each vertex of the set of solutions is obtained by re-assigning the mass not in the conditional event A to a single subset of A, just as in L 1 consistent approximation all the mass not in the principal ultrafilter {B ⊇ {x}} is re-assigned to the top of the ultrafilter, Θ.
Global approximation
The global L 1 consistent approximation in M coincides with the partial approximation (13) 
This is in accordance with our intuition, as it makes sense to focus on the singletons which are supported by the strongest evidence.
A running example
Consider as an example the belief function b with mass assignment
on the ternary frame Θ = {x, y, z}.
Suppose that we seek the L 1 approximation of b with core {x}. By Equation (13) we get the following consonant b.f.:
If, instead, we focus on {y} or {z} we get, respectively (see Figure 3 ):
Note that the partial approximation on CS z has {y, z} as actual core, and (15) is the partial approximation with core containing {y}. We can notice how the global approximation is visually much closer to the original b.f. than the partial ones, in terms of the structure of its focal elements.
The L ∞ norm of the difference vector is obviously minimized by {β(B)} such that: |β(B)| ≤ max C ⊃{x} m b (C) for all B ⊇ {x}, B = Θ, i.e., 
Clearly this set of solutions can also include pseudo belief functions. Also, a comparison of Equations (16) and (13) shows that the barycenter of the partial L ∞ approximations coincides with the partial L 1 approximation, reassigning all the mass outside the ultrafilter to the whole frame.
Global approximation
Once again, the global L ∞ consistent approximation in M coincides with the partial approximation (16) 
Global L ∞ solutions are not totally unrelated to their L 1 peers, as maximizing the plausibility of the core as in (14) involves minimizing the total mass outside the ultrafilter. 
Running example
This set is clearly not entirely admissible. The same can be verified for partial approximations with cores containing {y} and {z}, for which
Therefore, the global L ∞ approximations of (15) are the partial ones whose core contains y (as it was the case for the global L 1 approximation).
L 2 approximation
In order to find the L 2 consistent approximation(s) in M it is convenient to recall that the minimal L 2 distance between a point and a vector space is attained by the point of the vector space V such that the difference vector is orthogonal to all the generators g i of V : 
the partial L 2 approximation of b is obtained by equally redistributing to each element of the ultrafilter {B ⊇ {x}} an equal fraction of the mass of focal elements originally not in it:
The partial L 2 approximation in R N −1 redistributes the mass equally to all the elements of the ultrafilter.
Global approximation
The global L 2 consistent approximation in M is, as usual, given by the partial approximation (20) at minimal L 2 distance from m b . In the N − 2 representation, by definition of L 2 norm in M (11), the partial approximation focussed on x has distance from m b
which is minimized by the singleton(s) arg min
In the N − 1-dimensional representation, instead,
which is minimized by the same singleton(s). In any case, even though (in the N − 2 representation) the partial L 1 and L 2 approximations coincide, the global approximations in general may fall on different components of the consonant complex.
Running example
For the usual example b.f. (15) , by Equation (20) the L 2 partial approximations with cores containing x, y and x respectively have mass assignments: |Θ|−1 = 4 (see Figure 4 ). Note that, unlike the corresponding L 1 approximation, the partial L 2 approximation on {z} has indeed the singleton as core. Also, as L 2 approximation redistributes mass evenly to all the focal elements in the desired 
Calculation: approximation in the belief space
We have seen that in the mass space (at least in its N − 2 representation, Theorem 5) the L 1 and L 2 approximations coincide. This is true in the belief space in the general case as well. We will gather some intuition on the general solution by considering first the slightly more complex case of a ternary frame: Θ = {x, y, z}. In this Section we will use the notation:
In the case of an arbitrary frame a cs.b.f. cs ∈ CS 
An interesting fact emerges when comparing the linear systems for L 1 and L 2 in the ternary case Θ = {x, y, x}:
The solution is the same for both, due to the fact that the second linear system is obtained from the first one by a linear transformation of rows. We just need to replace the first equation e 1 in the first system with the difference: e 1 → e 1 − e 2 − e 3 . This holds in the general case, too. 
Proof. If we apply the linear transformation (25) to the system (22) we get
|C\B| ∀B : {x} ⊆ B Θ. Therefore by Lemma 1 we get
i.e., the system of equations (23).
Form of the solution
To obtain both the L 2 and the L 1 consistent approximations of b it then suffices to solve the system (23) associated with the L 1 norm. We can prove it by simple substitution, as system (23) 
for all events A such that {x} ⊆ A Θ. As for the mass of Θ, by normal-
as all events B ⊃ {x} can be written as B = A \ {x} for A = B ∪ {x}.
∀x ∈ Θ, and for all A s.t. {x} ⊆ A ⊆ Θ.
Global L 1 and L 2 approximations
To find the consistent approximation of b we need to work out which of the partial approximations cs 
In the binary case (Θ = {x, y}) the optimal singleton cores (26) simplify as:
arg min arg min
Once again, in the binary case the optimal singleton cores (27) specialize as:
arg min
and the global approximation for L 2 also falls on the component of the consistent complex associated with the element of maximal plausibility, while this is not generally true for an arbitrary frame.
Running example
According to Equation (33) , for the belief function (15) of our running example the partial L 1 /L 2 consistent approximations in B with core containing {x}, {y} and {z}, respectively, have mass assignments (see Figure 5 ):
We can note that kind of approximation tends to penalize the smallest, Figure 5 : (a) The belief function (15)
singleton element of the ultrafilter {B ⊇ x}: this is due to the fact that m b (x) = m b (x), while the masses of all the other elements of the filter are which is also minimized by the same partial solution. This is not necessarily the case, in general.
L ∞ consistent approximation
While the partial L 1 -and L 2 -consistent approximations in the belief space are pointwise and coincide, the set of partial L ∞ -approximations for each component CS x B of the consistent complex form a polytope whose center of mass is exactly equal to cs
General solution
By applying the expression (8) of the L ∞ norm to the difference vector b − cs in the belief space, where cs is a consistent b.f. with core containing x, we obtain max A Θ B⊆A m b (B) − B⊆A,B⊇{x} m cs (B) . Therefore, the partial L ∞ consistent approximation with core containing x is:
Again, max A Θ has as lower limit the value associated with the largest norm which does not depend on m cs (.), i.e., 
defines a high-dimensional "rectangle" in the space of the solutions {γ(A), {x} ⊆ A Θ}.
In the mass assignment m cs (.) of the desired approximations, as we can clearly see in the running ternary example, the solution set is polytope whose vertices do not appear to have straightforward interpretations. On the other hand, the barycenter of this polytope is easy to compute and interpret.
Barycenter of the L ∞ solution and global approximation
The center of mass of the set of solutions (31) of the consistent complex CS B in the belief space is also the geometric barycenter of the set its L ∞ consistent approximations on the same component. Its global L ∞ consistent approximations in B form the union of the partial L ∞ approximations associated with the maximal plausibility element(s) x ∈ Θ.
Running example
For the usual belief function (15) on the ternary frame, the set of partial L ∞ solutions (31) focussed on x becomes: 
do not appear to be particularly meaningful. Their barycenter, instead,
clearly coincides with the focussed consistent approximation on x. The same holds for the barycenters of the L ∞ approximations focussed on y and z (see Equation (28)).
Discussion
Let us conclude by discussing the interpretation of the consistent approximations derives in the mass and belief space, and by comparing their features and geometry, with the help of the usual ternary example.
Approximation in the mass space and general imaging in belief revision
As it is the case for geometric conditioning in the mass space [23] , consistent approximations in the mass space can be interpreted as a generalization of Lewis' imaging approach to belief revision, originally formulated in the context of probabilities [39] . The idea behind imaging is that, upon observing that some state x ∈ Θ is impossible, you transfer the probability initially assigned to x completely towards the remaining state you deem the most similar to x [41] . Peter Gärdenfors [40] extended Lewis' idea by allowing a fraction λ i of the probability of such state x to be re-distributed to all remaining states x i ( i λ i = 1). In the case of partial consistent approximation of belief functions, the mass m b (A) of each focal element not in the desired ultrafilter {A ⊇ {x}} should be re-assigned to the "closest" focal element in the latter. The partial L 1 consistent approximation in M amounts to admitting ignorance about the closeness of focal elements, and re-assigning all the mass outside the filter to the whole frame, therefore increasing the uncertainty of the state. If such ignorance is expressed by assigning instead equal weight λ(A) to each A ∈ C, the resulting partial consistent approximation is the unique partial L 2 approximation, the barycenter of the polytope of L 1 partial approximations.
Partial L1/L2 approximations as focused consistent transformations
The expression of the the basic probability assignment of the L 1 /L 2 consistent approximations of b (Corollary 2) is simple and elegant. It also has a straightforward interpretation: to get a consistent belief function focused on a singleton x, the mass contribution of all events B such that B ∪ {x} = A coincide is assigned indeed to A. But there are just two such events: A itself, and A \ {x}. The partial consistent approximation of a belief function on a frame Θ = {x, y, z, w} with core {x} is illustrated in Figure 6 . The b.f. with focal elements {y}, {y, z}, and {x, z, w} is transformed by the map {y} → {x} ∪ {y} = {x, y}, {y, z} → {x} ∪ {y, z} = {x, y, z}, {x, z, w} → {x} ∪ {x, z, w} = {x, z, w} into the consistent b.f. with focal elements {x, y}, {x, y, z}, and {x, z, w} and the same b.p.a. The partial solutions to the L 1 /L 2 consistent approximation problem turn out to be related to the classical inner consonant approximations of a b.f. b, i.e., the set of consonant belief functions co such that
. Dubois and Prade [17] proved indeed that such an approximation exists iff b is consistent. However, when b is not consistent a "focused consistent transformation" can be applied to get a new belief function b such that
and x i is the element of Θ with highest plausibility. Clearly then, the results of Theorem and Corollary say that the L 1 /L 2 consistent approximation onto each component CS x B of CS B generates the consistent transformation focused on x.
Improper solutions and unnormalized belief functions
In some cases, improper partial solutions (in the sense that they potentially include negative mass assignments) can be generated by the L p minimization process. This situation is not entirely new. For instance, outer consonant approximations [17] also include infinitely many improper solutions: nevertheless, only the subset of acceptable solutions is retained. As in the consonant case [28] , the set of all (admissible and not) solutions is typically much simpler to describe geometrically, in terms of simplices or polytopes. Computing the set of proper approximations in all cases requires significant further effort, which for reasons of clarity and length we reserve for the near future.
Additionally, in this work only "normalized" belief functions, i.e., b.f.s whose mass of the empty set is nil, are considered. Unnormalized b.f.s, however, play an important role in the TBM [42] as the mass of the empty set is an indicator of conflicting evidence. The analysis of the unnormalized case is also left to future work for lack of sufficient space here.
Mass-versus belief-consistent approximations
Summarizing, in the mass space:
• the partial L 1 consistent approximation focussed on a certain element x of the frame is obtained by reassigning all the mass b(x c ) outside the filter to Θ;
• the global approximation is associated, as expected, with cores containing the maximal plausibility element(s) of Θ;
• the L ∞ approximation generates a "rectangle" of partial approximations, with barycenter in the L 1 partial approximation;
• the corresponding global approximations spans the component(s) focussed on the element(s) x such that max B ⊃x m b (B) is minimal;
• the L 2 partial approximation coincides with the L 1 one in the N − 2 representation;
• in the N − 1 representation the L 2 partial approximation reassigns the mass outside the desired filter (b(x c )) to each element of the filter focussed on x on equal basis;
• global approximations in the L 2 case are of more difficult interpretation.
In the belief space:
• partial L 1 /L 2 approximations coincide on each component of the consistent complex;
• such partial L 1 /L 2 approximation turns out to be the consistent transformation [17] focused on the considered element of the frame: for all events
• the corresponding global solutions have not in general as core the maximal plausibility element, and may lie in general on different components of CS; the L 1 global consistent approximation is associated with the singleton(s) x ∈ Θ such that:x = arg min x A⊆{x} c b(A), while the L 2 global approximation is associated withx = arg min x A⊆{x} c (b(A)) 2 which do not appear to have simple epistemic interpretations;
• the set of partial L ∞ solutions form a polytope on each component of the consistent complex, whose center of mass lies on the partial L 1 /L 2 approximation;
• the global L ∞ solutions fall on the component(s) associated with the maximal plausibility element(s), and their center of mass, when such element is unique, is the consistent transformation focused on the maximal plausibility singleton [17] .
By comparing the behavior of the two classes of approximations we can notice a general pattern. Approximations in both mass and belief space reassign the mass outside the filter focussed on x, in different ways. However, mass consistent approximations reassign this mass b(x c ) either to no focal element in the filter (i.e., to Θ) or to all on an equal basis. They do not distinguish between focal elements w.r.t. their set-theoretic relationships with subsets B ⊃ x outside the filter. In opposition, approximations in the belief space do distinguish them according to the focussed consistent transformation principle.
Comparison on a ternary example
To conclude, let us graphically illustrate the different approximations for the belief function of the running ternary example. Figure 7 illustrates the different partial consistent approximations in the simplex Cl( m x , m x,y , m x,z , m Θ ) of consistent belief functions focussed on x in a ternary frame, for the belief function (15) . This is the solid black tetrahedron of Figure 7 .
The set of partial L ∞ approximations in M (18) is represented by the green cube in the Figure. As expected, it does not entirely fall inside the tetrahedron of admissible consistent belief functions. Its barycenter (the green star) coincides with the L 1 partial consistent approximation in M. The L 2 approximation in M does also coincide, as expected, with the L 1 approximation. There seems to be a strong case for the latter approximation, whose natural interpretation in terms of mass assignment is the following: all the mass outside the desired ultrafilter {B ⊇ x} is reassigned to Θ, increasing the overall uncertainty of the belief state. The L 2 , M partial approximation in the N − 1 representation is distinct from the previous ones, but still falls inside the polytope of L ∞ partial approximations (green cube) and is admissible, as it falls in the interior of the simplicial component Cl( m x , m x,y , m x,z , m Θ ). It itself possesses a strong interpretation, as the overall mass not in the desired ultrafilter focused on x is equally redistributed to all elements of the filter. Finally, the unique L 1 /L 2 partial approximation in B of Equation (28) (which is also the barycenter (32) of the partial L ∞ approximations in B) is shown as a red square. Just as the L 1 /L 2 approximation in M (green star), it attributes zero mass to {x, z}, which fails to be supported by any focal element of the original belief function. As a result, they both fall on the border of the tetrahedron of admissible consistent b.f.s focussed on x (highlighted in yellow).
Conclusions
Consistent belief functions represent consistent knowledge bases in the belief logic interpretation of the theory of evidence. Given a belief function inferred from conflicting expert judgments or measurements, the use of a consistent transformation prior to making a decision may be desirable. In this paper we solved the specific instance of the consistent approximation problem associated with measuring distances between belief function using classical L p norms, in both belief and mass spaces. This is motivated by the fact that consistent belief functions live in a simplicial complex defined in terms of the L ∞ norm. The obtained approximations typically have straightforward interpretations in terms of degrees of belief or mass redistribution. The interpretation of the polytope of all L ∞ solutions is a bit more complex, and worth to be fully investigated in the near future, in the light of the interesting analogy with the polytope of consistent probabilities. 
